On 16 December 1944, German troops launched their final major offensive of the Second World War. Just as they had done in 1940, they sent tanks crashing through the Ardennes forest, aiming for the coast. The plan was ambitious and desperate: split the British and American armies in two, shatter their alliance, and free Germany to concentrate fully on its “real” enemy in the east—the Soviet Union.

None of that happened.

This time it was 1944, not 1940. The circumstances had changed completely. After fierce American resistance slowed the German advance, the Allies were able to unleash their greatest advantage: air power. The Germans did manage to carve a temporary bulge into the Allied line—giving the battle its name—but by the end of January 1945, that bulge had been erased. The Allies once again stood poised on the doorstep of Germany.

So what went wrong for the Germans? Why couldn’t they repeat their stunning success of 1940? And was this offensive doomed from the start?

Germany’s Position in Late 1944

By September 1944, Germany was on the defensive in almost every direction.

In the west, the Allies had broken out of Normandy, taken Paris, and raced all the way to the German border. In the east, the Red Army had smashed Army Group Centre in Operation Bagration and pushed deep into Poland and the Baltic region. In Italy, German forces were being slowly forced back up the peninsula.

At home, the situation was dire. Allied bombers pounded German cities day and night. Factories, railways, fuel plants, and housing were being destroyed at a rate that German industry could not sustain. Supplies, resources, and manpower were all running low.

It seemed, on the surface, only a matter of time before Germany was crushed.

And yet Adolf Hitler still believed that one last offensive in the west could change everything.

He was convinced that the Anglo-American alliance was fragile and that a major crisis could fracture the relationship between the United States and Britain. Above all, he saw no way to win against the Soviets in the east, whose manpower seemed endless and whose territory was vast. If he could deal a severe blow to the Western Allies, he hoped to negotiate a peace in the west, then turn his remaining strength against the USSR.

Operation “Watch on the Rhine”

The plan for this final gamble was codenamed Wacht am Rhein—Watch on the Rhine. It called for a concentrated attack along a roughly 60-mile (100 km) front against the American line in the Ardennes, from Malmedy in Belgium down to Echternach in Luxembourg. The area was considered quiet, a backwater sector. Only six weakened American divisions held the line there, some full of inexperienced troops fresh to the front, others resting after heavy fighting.

The German attack force included three major components:

6th SS Panzer Army under Sepp Dietrich in the north

5th Panzer Army under Hasso von Manteuffel in the center

7th Army under Erich Brandenberger in the south

In total, 29 divisions, 12 of them armored, would spearhead the attack. The idea was that the 7th Army would guard the southern flank, the 5th Panzer Army would push west and then north toward Brussels, and the 6th SS Panzer Army would drive further north and west, cross the Meuse, and seize Antwerp.

Antwerp was crucial. Without it, the Allies would have to continue bringing supplies all the way from Normandy through long, vulnerable overland routes. If the Germans could capture Antwerp and thrust to the coast, they could isolate and possibly destroy Allied forces to the north, which were mostly British and Canadian. Hitler believed such a disaster would shatter the Western alliance and open the door to negotiations.

But his own senior commanders were skeptical.

Field Marshals Gerd von Rundstedt (Commander-in-Chief West) and Walter Model (Army Group B) both doubted the feasibility of reaching the Meuse, let alone Antwerp. They warned that creating a deep bulge would leave the attacking forces dangerously exposed to counter-attacks from the north and south. They proposed more limited operations instead, designed to inflict heavy casualties and stabilize the front.

Hitler rejected these alternatives outright. He was fixated on repeating the Ardennes miracle of 1940, when German armor had—against many expectations—sliced through France. This time, however, it was not 1940. The enemy, the terrain, and the balance of forces were all very different.

Building the Offensive: Manpower and Fuel

Germany’s manpower crisis was severe. Since the start of the war, the Wehrmacht had suffered over 3.2 million dead. To scrape together enough troops for the Ardennes offensive, the regime lowered the draft age to 16 and raised it to 60, transferring men from the Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine to the army. Civilian workers deemed non-essential were also conscripted.

Many of these troops were organized into new Volksgrenadier divisions—“People’s Grenadier” divisions. These units were streamlined versions of regular infantry divisions, filled with a mix of battle-hardened veterans and barely trained recruits. To stiffen them, elite Panzer and Waffen-SS units were brought in from the Eastern Front and given priority for the newest tanks, vehicles, and weapons.

Hitler also authorized special operations. SS commando Otto Skorzeny, famous for rescuing Mussolini in 1943, was tasked with a covert mission. His men, dressed in American uniforms and driving captured American vehicles, were to sow confusion behind Allied lines—misdirect units, mislabel road signs, cut communication lines. Additionally, a small Fallschirmjäger (paratrooper) formation was hastily reactivated and dropped behind enemy lines. Poorly trained and badly used, most were quickly captured and had little impact.

Despite all constraints, the Germans managed to assemble over 300,000 men, around 2,100 tanks and assault guns, and roughly 1,900 artillery pieces for the Ardennes. On paper, it was an impressive force.

In the air, the picture was far worse.

By late 1944, the Allies absolutely dominated the skies over Western Europe. German forces could barely move in daylight without risking devastating attacks from Allied fighter-bombers. For the Ardennes plan to work, they needed bad weather to ground Allied aircraft while German troops moved into position and launched their attack.

Fuel was another major crisis. Allied bombing had shattered Germany’s synthetic oil industry. Stocks were critically low. The Ardennes offensive depended on armored and mechanized formations that drank fuel. The Germans managed to stockpile about five million gallons for the operation—enough for roughly six days of offensive fighting. That wasn’t enough to reach Antwerp. The plan therefore assumed the capture of Allied fuel dumps along the way. Without captured fuel, the entire offensive would stall.

Every part of the plan rested on thin ice. Germany remained numerically inferior and could not afford a prolonged battle of attrition. The timetable had to be obeyed with near-perfection. According to the schedule:

By Day 2, the Germans had to seize St. Vith and Bastogne to secure key road junctions and cross the Ourthe River.

By Day 4, they needed to reach the Meuse.

Only then could they push on toward Antwerp.

Surprise was absolutely essential. And they did achieve it.

Surprise in the Ardennes

Security around the planning of the offensive was extremely tight, especially after the failed July 20th assassination attempt on Hitler. Officers involved in the plan signed secrecy oaths under threat of death. In the field, the dense Ardennes forests helped conceal the movement of German forces. Heavy fog, snow, and low clouds limited Allied reconnaissance flights. While the Allies had broken some German codes, many of the key communications for this operation occurred within Germany, limiting opportunities for interception.

Even with that advantage, senior German officers remained doubtful. The plan required perfect conditions: surprise, bad flying weather, rapid advances, and captured fuel. If any of those variables failed, the whole operation could collapse.

Nonetheless, Hitler rolled the dice.

The Attack: December 16th, 1944

At 5:30 a.m., December 16th, German guns opened fire along the Ardennes front. For 90 minutes, artillery hammered American positions. Then, about 200,000 German troops struck the roughly 80,000 Americans holding the sector.

The first warning for many U.S. units, like the 110th Infantry Regiment, was the explosions falling around them.

Initially, things went well for the Germans. The attack achieved complete tactical surprise. The weather was terrible—foggy, snowy, freezing—grounding most Allied aircraft. German armored spearheads advanced into the forest, pushing back confused and disorganized American defenses.

But cracks appeared almost immediately in the German timetable.

In the north, the 6th SS Panzer Army tried to capture the vital ridge at Elsenborn, which overlooked key roads toward the Meuse. The American 99th Infantry Division—and eventually other units—stubbornly held the line. Despite repeated assaults, the Germans never secured this critical terrain.

Further south, the small town of St. Vith was another crucial objective. The plan required it to fall by Day 2. Instead, its defenders held out for five days before withdrawing. That delay disrupted schedules and pushed back all subsequent timetables.

Bastogne, a major road hub, proved even more critical. The Americans recognized its importance almost immediately and sent reinforcements: the 101st Airborne Division and elements of the 10th Armored Division reached Bastogne on December 19th. Within days, the town was completely surrounded and besieged—but it did not fall. Its defenders, short on food, ammunition, and medical supplies, held on in freezing conditions for over a week.

Across the Ardennes, small U.S. units mounted heroic delaying actions at key road junctions, bridges, and crossroads. The terrain funneled movement along narrow routes. By holding or blocking crucial road nets, small forces could slow entire divisions. As reinforcements poured in, the German advance became more and more congested.

At the start of the offensive, there were about 80,000 American troops in the Ardennes. By Christmas Eve, roughly 500,000 Allied soldiers—American, British, and others—were in the area.

On December 19th, Eisenhower made two major decisions:

He placed all Allied forces north of the German bulge under the command of Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery.

He ordered the British XXX Corps, which had been resting in reserve, to move south and guard the Meuse crossings.

As Allied reinforcements arrived, the German advance slowed further and further. According to the German schedule, they should have reached the line between St. Vith and Bastogne by December 18th and the Meuse by the 20th. By Christmas Eve, they were still far short of the river.

Meanwhile, fuel shortages were biting hard. German plans had counted on capturing Allied fuel dumps intact. But the delay in the offensive gave Allied quartermasters time to evacuate and destroy stocks. Drivers of the Red Ball Express—many of them African-American—played a key role in moving supplies out of the danger zone and burning what couldn’t be saved.

Traffic jams plagued the German formations. Narrow roads clogged with tanks, trucks, horse-drawn wagons, and fuel shortages made it harder and harder to sustain momentum. Even where fuel existed, it was difficult to deliver it to the units that needed it most.

For all that, the weather continued to favor the Germans—for a while. It was brutally cold, with temperatures averaging around –7°C (20°F). Many U.S. troops lacked proper winter clothing and suffered frostbite, exposure, and misery. The skies remained mostly overcast, keeping Allied air power grounded.

Then, on December 23rd, the weather finally lifted.

Airpower and Counterattack

When the clouds broke, the Allies brought their greatest asset back into play. Fighters and fighter-bombers from U.S. Ninth Air Force and the RAF’s Second Tactical Air Force began attacking German armor, supply convoys, and troop columns. At the same time, transport aircraft dropped desperately needed supplies to the encircled defenders at Bastogne.

The tide had turned.

General George S. Patton’s Third Army, which had been preparing an offensive into the Saar, pivoted north on Eisenhower’s orders. Patton had anticipated such a possibility and had staff plans ready. In a remarkable feat of logistics and command, Third Army wheeled 90 degrees in winter conditions and advanced north to relieve Bastogne. On December 26th, Patton’s forces broke through the encirclement and linked up with the 101st Airborne, ending the siege.

The Ardennes Offensive had now stalled. Time—always against the Germans—had run out.

Germany still attempted to regain some initiative. On January 1st, 1945, the Luftwaffe launched Operation Bodenplatte, a surprise air assault on Allied airfields in the Low Countries. They managed to destroy or damage around 300 Allied aircraft—but in doing so lost over 200 experienced pilots and many of their remaining fighters. It was a pyrrhic success at best, and in effect a final, fatal blow to the Luftwaffe as an effective fighting force in the West.

Further south, in Alsace-Lorraine, the Germans launched Operation Nordwind, another offensive aimed at exploiting perceived American weakness and drawing away Allied reserves. But this attack was anticipated, met, and stopped with heavy German losses. Meanwhile, Allied forces continued their counter-offensives in the Ardennes from both north and south.

By the end of January, the bulge in the line was gone. The front had largely returned to its pre-offensive position.

The Cost and the Outcome

The Battle of the Bulge was costly for both sides. German casualties ranged from 80,000 to 100,000. Allied losses were around 75,000. The crucial difference was that the Allies could replace their losses. Germany, with its manpower and industrial base collapsing, could not.

The battle was also marked by multiple atrocities. The most infamous was the Malmedy massacre, where Waffen-SS troops murdered dozens of American prisoners. But there were others: killings of civilians in Belgian villages like Stavelot, Ster, Renardmont, and Parfondruy; the murder of 11 African-American POWs at Wereth; and retaliatory killings of German prisoners by U.S. troops at places like Chenogne.

Hitler’s gamble had cost the Wehrmacht dearly for almost no strategic gain. To succeed, everything had needed to go perfectly. It didn’t.

The Germans did achieve tactical surprise. But they never reached the Meuse, let alone Antwerp. The strict timetable was shattered almost immediately. When the weather cleared on December 23rd, Allied air superiority returned with devastating consequences.

Most importantly, the German army in 1944–45 was not fighting the same enemy it had faced in 1940. American units, far from breaking, fought with stubborn tenacity. They delayed, defended, and counterattacked. Allied operational mobility—tanks, trucks, and aircraft—allowed them to plug gaps, move reinforcements quickly, and respond decisively in ways France and Britain had not been able to do four years earlier.

The Ardennes Offensive dragged Germany into precisely the kind of battle it could not afford: a battle of attrition against an enemy with greater numbers, greater reserves, and greater industrial power.

Was it doomed from the start? Most of the senior German commanders involved in the planning thought so. And even if we indulge a hypothetical—imagine that the Germans had reached Antwerp—what then? They hoped the Western Allies would sue for peace, but that seems extremely unlikely. After the enormous effort, blood, and treasure spent on invading and liberating France, Britain and the United States were not about to walk away.

In the end, the Battle of the Bulge was Hitler’s last throw of the dice—a desperate “Hail Mary” attempt to change a war that had already turned against him. Instead of reversing Germany’s fortunes, it accelerated their decline. The offensive expended reserves of men, fuel, and equipment that Germany could not replace. When the Soviets launched their massive Vistula–Oder offensive in January 1945, German resistance crumbled, and the Red Army advanced hundreds of miles toward Berlin in mere weeks. Two months later, the Western Allies crossed the Rhine and entered Germany.

The war in Europe was nearing its inevitable conclusion.